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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION V. SCHOR:
ARTICLE III FINDS A HOME ON THE
SLIPPERY SLOPE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution grants the federal judicial power to
courts created under the life tenure and guaranteed salary strictures of
article I.1 But Congress has long exercised wide discretion in assigning
adjudicatory powers to non-article III tribunals such as administrative
agencies, federal magistrates and legislative courts. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the problem of federal judicial power in
the hands of one type of non-article III tribunal-an administrative
agency. In Commodity FuturesTrading Commission v. Schor,2 the Court
focused on the question of whether the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over state law counterclaims
brought in administrative reparations proceedings violated the Constitution. The Court concluded that the agency's exercise of jurisdiction over
such common-law claims did not run afoul of article III.
In making this finding, the majority of the Court adopted an ad hoc
balancing approach to questions of whether congressional grants of adjudicatory powers to non-article III tribunals violate article III and the
separation of powers.' This approach departed from a stance taken by
the Court on the same issue several years earlier in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.5 In Northern Pipeline, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of Congress' broad grant of powers
to the bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.6 The
1. Article III, section 1 provides:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during

good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).

3. Id. at 3261.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-48.
5. 458 U.S. 50 (1982), laterproceeding, 459 U.S. 813 (1982). For a more thorough dis-

cussion of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., see ifra notes 125-58
and accompanying text.
6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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Court held this grant unconstitutional 7 because the authority given the
bankruptcy courts did not fall within three narrow exceptions for grants
of power to territorial courts, courts-martial and legislative courts and
administrative agencies adjudicating cases involving "public rights."8 In
each of these exceptions, the Court historically had recognized certain
exceptional powers afforded Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus. "Only in the face of such an exceptional grant of power
[had] the Court declined to hold the authority of Congress subject to the
general prescriptions of Art. III. '9 Thus, the Court confined the federal
judicial power to article III courts.
The Schor majority's opinion suffers from several weaknesses. The
ad hoc balancing approach adopted in Schor as a whole is improper in
the article III context. It presents the danger of incremental erosion of
the important protections of article III.10 The components of the balancing test lack principled distinctions to be applied by courts seeking in the
future to define the limits of non-article III adjudicatory authority.II
More fundamentally, inclusion of the apparently decisive factor of "legislative convenience" in the majority's analysis implicates basic issues in
constitutional theory respecting the separation of powers' 2 and the relevance of original intent and current values to constitutional
interpretation.13
This Note analyzes the approach taken by the Court to reach its
conclusion in Schor, in view of the Constitution, precedent and the lower
courts' need for guidance. In addition, this Note examines the implications of the Schor decision within the contexts of various theories of the
separation of powers and of judicial review in constitutional cases. While
this Note does not contend that the result reached in Schor was incorrect,
it does criticize the approach taken to reach that conclusion. Thus, in
light of the needs of the "administrative state"' 4 and the separation of
powers concerns of article III, this Note suggests an alternative analysis
which may provide better support for the Court's decision than its present approach.
7. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87.
8. Id. at 64-67, 70-71. For a discussion of the public rights doctrine. see infra notes 14052 and accompanying text and note 154.
9. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 169-76.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 177-213.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 214-29.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 230-40.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 159-67.

ARTICLE III -,

January 1988)
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Facts

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor'5 arose when William T. Schor filed complaints with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) against his commodity futures broker, ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti) and a Conti employee,16 thereby invoking
the CFTC's reparations jurisdiction.17 Schor's account with Conti contained a debit balance because his net futures trading losses and expenses
exceeded the funds in the account."8 He contended that this debit balance resulted from violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by
Conti, which were the subject of his complaints.' 9 Meanwhile, prior to
receiving notice of the commencement of the reparations proceeding,
Conti filed suit against Schor in federal district court, 2o to collect the
debit balance in his account.2 ' Schor counterclaimed in that federal action, restating his charges that Conti's violations of the CEA were the
cause of the debit balance.22 Schor twice moved to dismiss or stay the
federal action on the grounds that continuing that action would waste
judicial resources and unduly burden the litigants. 23 According to Schor,
the reparations proceedings would fully adjudicate the rights put at issue
by the transactions that gave rise to the federal action. 24 Conti then voluntarily dismissed the federal action, choosing instead to counterclaim
for the debit balance in the CFTC reparations proceeding.25 Furthermore, Conti denied it had violated the CEA and instead alleged that the
debit balance resulted from Schor's own trading and was, therefore,
merely a simple debt.26
The administrative law judge that presided over Schor's reparations
15. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
16. Id. at 3250.
17. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) provides for the filing with the CFTC of complaints for the violation of the CEA or any rule thereunder against persons registered under
the CEA and authorizes the CFTC to issue rules respecting the determination of such disputes.
Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 14, 88 Stat. 1393 (1974) (current version at
7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)). Pursuant to this authority, the CFTC promulgated rules regarding the
conduct of its reparations proceedings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-12.408 (1987).
18. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3250.
19. Id.
20. Id.; Conti-Commodity Serv., Inc. v. Mortgage Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 80-C-1089
(N.D. Ill., filed Mar. 4, 1980).
21. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3250.
22. Id. at 3250-51.
23. Id. at 3251.
24. Id. The district court declined to stay or dismiss the suit. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.

710
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proceeding ruled for Conti and found that Conti had not violated the
CEA nor had its conduct resulted in Schor's debit balance.1 7 Schor then
initiated a challenge to the statutory authority of the CFTC to adjudicate
Conti's state law counterclaim. 8 When the case finally came before the
Supreme Court for decision, the critical issue was whether the CFTC's
adjudication of Conti's common-law counterclaim violated article III of
the Constitution.
B.

Reasoning of the Court
1. Majority

Addressing the article III question in Schor, 9 the Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, admitted that its precedents in that area were
27. Id.
28. Id. The administrative law judge (ALJ), bound by the CFrC's policy of exercising

jurisdiction over such counterclaims and concomitant CFTC regulations, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 12.19 (1987) (corresponds to 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1982)), rejected Schor's challenge.
Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3251. The Commission allowed the ALJ's decision to become final without review, and Schor petitioned for review with the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Id. The court of appeals, sua sponte, questioned whether, in light of Northern Pipeline, the CFTC's adjudication of Conti's counterclaims was constitutional. Id.
The court of appeals ordered the ALJ's decisions on Conti's counterclaims reversed and

dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction on the ground that the CFTC lacked authority to adjudicate
common-law counterclaims. Id. at 3251. Having decided that under Northern Pipeline the
CFTC's assumption of jurisdiction of Conti's common law counterclaim caused grave constitutional problems, the court of appeals gave a limited construction to the CEA so as to avoid
unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Id. at 3251. The court construed the CEA to empower the CFTC to adjudicate only counterclaims alleging violations of the CEA or CFTC
regulations, both beyond the scope of Conti's common-law counterclaim. Id. at 3251-52.
The Supreme Court granted the CFTC's petition for certiorari, vacated the court of appeals' judgment, and in light of Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985), remanded the case for additional consideration. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3252. For a
discussion of Thomas, see infra note 154. The court of appeals reinstated its prior judgment,
concluding that Thomas did not alter its view that the CFTC's power to decide common-law
counterclaims in reparations proceedings was of questionable constitutionality under article
III of the Constitution and Northern Pipeline. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3252. The Supreme Court
for a second time granted certiorari. 474 U.S. 1018 (1985).
29. In the first part of the Schor opinion, the Court rejected the court of appeals' restrictive
construction of the CFTC's statutory authority to adjudicate counterclaims. It found that
Congress intended to grant the CFTC broad power to define the sort of counterclaims adjudicable in reparations proceedings. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct.
3245, 3253 (1986). It further stated that Congress carried out this intent by clearly authorizing
in section 8a(5) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1982), CFTC promulgation of regulations
providing for agency adjudication of common-law counterclaims arising from the same transaction as an alleged CEA violation "because such jurisdiction is necessary, if not critical, to
accomplish the purposes behind the reparations program." Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3253. The
Court emphasized the "crippling effect" that the court of appeals' restrictive reading of the
CFTC's counterclaim jurisdiction would have on the reparations scheme. Id. Having disposed of the court of appeals' argument, the Court thus presented itself with the issue of

January 1988]

ARTICLE III

not amenable to "easy synthesis." 3 However, these cases did establish
that the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of adjudicative
power to a non-article III tribunal must be determined in light of the
purposes behind article 1M1.31 According to the Court, article III, section
1 is intended both as a protection of the role of the independent judiciary
in the constitutional scheme of tripartite government, and as a safeguard
of litigants' rights to impartial adjudication in the federal courts.32
Looking to the "structural principle" of article III, the Court recognized that article III safeguards the role of the judiciary in tripartite government. It does so by preventing congressional efforts to grant
jurisdiction to non-article III tribunals so as to emasculate article III
courts.33 The Court refused to adopt formal, inflexible rules to gauge to
what extent a congressional authorization of article III power to a nonarticle III tribunal would violate the separation of powers. According to
the Court, such rules might "unduly restrict Congress' ability to take
needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers." 34 Instead, the Court focused on the practical effect that congressional action
would have on the constitutional role of the federal judiciary. To achieve
that end, the Court would weigh a number of factors.3 5 The factors enumerated by the Court were:
the extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power"
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the
origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements
of Article III.36
In analyzing the first factor, the Court reasoned that the congressional scheme here did not impermissibly intrude on the province of the
whether the CFTC's exercise of jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims violated article
III. Id. at 3255.
30. Id. at 3256. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens.
31. Id. The Court stated that this inquiry would be "guided by the principle that 'practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform
application of Article III.'" Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 582-83 (1985)).
32. Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-83
(1985); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
33. Id. at 3257.
34. Id. at 3258.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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article III judiciary because the CFTC's adjudicatory powers differed

from the "traditional agency model' 3 7 merely because of its jurisdiction
over common-law counterclaims. 8 The Court, decrying any fear of
"some hypothetical 'slippery slope,'" concluded there was "little practi-

cal reason to find that this single deviation from the agency model [was]
fatal to the congressional scheme."3 9 According to the Court, except for

the authorization of counterclaim jurisdiction, the CEA left enough of
the "essential attributes of judicial power" to article III courts to justify a

finding that article III was not violated. The recognition that the
agency's orders were not self-executing, as well as the levels of judicial
review to which the agency's rulings were subject, figured heavily in this
inquiry.'
Turning to the next factor, the nature of the right to be adjudicated,
the Court acknowledged that the counterclaim asserted in this case was a

"private" right for which state law provides the rule of decision. Such a

claim, the Court recognized, was the sort assumed to be at the "core" of
article III courts' jurisdiction.4" But the Court found no reason to ac-

cord the state law label talismanic power in article III analysis. Instead,
it analogized this state law character of a right to the characterization of
certain rights as "public." The Court had previously rejected the public
37. See infra note 159.
38. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258. The Court found the CFTC's exercise of jurisdiction over
common-law counterclaims "not without precedent." Id. (citing, inter ala,Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323 (1966)); but see infra note 181.
39. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3258.
40. Id. at 3258-59. The Court compared and contrasted the instant case with the part of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline and with the agency
model found constitutional in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931), finding the CEA more
closely analogous to the Crowell agency model. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3258-59. For a discussion
of Crowell in its historical context, see infra text accompanying notes 102-06. According to the
Schor Court, the CFTC, like the United States Employees' Compensation Commission in
Crowell, deals exclusively with a particularized area of the law, while the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction invalidated in Northern Pipeline extended to "'all civil proceedings arising under
title I1 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.'" Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 114, 98 Stat. 343 (1984)) (emphasis
in original). Moreover, the CFTC's orders, like the Crowell agency's, but unlike the bankruptcy courts', are enforceable only by order of the district court, see 7 U.S.C. § 18(d) (1982),
and are reviewed, like the Crowell agency's, under a weight of the evidence standard, see 7
U.S.C. § 9 (1982), instead of "the more deferential standard found lacking in Northern Pipeline." Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259. Further, the majority noted, the CFTC's legal rulings, like
the Employees' Compensation Commission's, are subject to de novo review. Id. Finally, the
CFTC, unlike the bankruptcy courts, does not exercise "'all ordinary powers of the district
courts,' and thus may not, for instance, preside over jury trials or issue writs of habeus
corpus." Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
85 (1982)).
41. Id. at 3259.
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ARTICLE III

rights distinction as determinative for article III purposes.4 2 The Court
then asserted that where such state-created rights are in contention, it
conducts a "searching" inquiry into the congressional scheme. Nevertheless, looking beyond the form to the substance of Congress' action, the
Court concluded that Congress' authorization of "limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the
CFTC's primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function" did not substantially threaten the separation of powers.43
Finally, the Court analyzed the third factor, the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of article III. The Court noted
Congress' intent in authorizing the CFTC to adjudicate counterclaims:
"to create an inexpensive and expeditious" forum which would facilitate
customers' enforcement of the provisions of the CEA, rather than to allocate jurisdiction among federal tribunals." The Court asserted that "[i]t
was only to ensure the effectiveness of [the reparations] scheme that Congress authorized the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims." 4 5 Furthermore, the Court noted that the CFTC's
"adjudication of common law counterclaims is incidental to, and completely dependent upon, adjudication of reparations claims created by
federal law." 46 In actuality, the Court stated, such adjudication is limited to claims arising from the same transaction as the federal reparations
claim.47 The Court concluded that under the circumstances, the extent
of any intrusion on the federal judiciary was de minimis.4 8
With respect to the interplay between the structural and personal
interests protected by article III, the Court reasoned that its prior discussions of article III, section l's guarantee "intimated that this guarantee
42. Id. The Court found the state law character of a claim "significant for purposes of

determining the effect that an initial adjudication of those claims by a non-Article III tribunal
will have on the separation of powers." Id.
43. Id. at 3259-60.
44. Id. at 3260. The Court further noted that Congress' decision to grant the CFTC counterclaim jurisdiction was understandable in light of the CFTC's perceived relative immunity
from political pressures and the CFTC's expertise. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Court claimed that:
[W]ere we to hold that the Legislative Branch may not permit such limited cognizance of common law counterclaims at the election of the parties, it is clear that we
would "defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous,

expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."

Id. at 3260-61 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
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serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests. 49
The Court pointed out that article III does not grant to litigants an absolute right to the consideration of all claims by an article III tribunal; as a

personal right, the guarantee of article III is subject to waiver, much like
the right to trial by jury in civil and criminal cases.5 ° The Court found
that Schor's initial demand that the entire dispute be settled in the repa-

rations forum indicated an express waiver by him of any right he may
have had to an article III court's resolution of Conti's counterclaim. 5'
But the Court qualified its waiver analysis, stating that "[t]o the extent
that this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties
cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason
that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject matter
'
jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. )52
Finally, the Court declared that its decision in Bowsher v. Synar,13 a
case involving separation of powers issues and decided the same day as
Schor, was not inapposite. Bowsher concerned the propriety of the exer-

cise of executive powers by a legislative functionary, the Comptroller
General. The Court found Bowsher and Schor reconcilable since unlike
Schor, Bowsher involved a question of "the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch."5 4

In sum, the Schor majority adopted an ad hoe balancing approach to
review the constitutionality of congressional assignments of adjudicatory
authority to non-article III tribunals. In this approach, the constitutional separation of powers concerns underlying article III are weighed
against a number of factors, the most dispositive of which appears to be
49. Id. at 3256.
50. Id. The majority cited Northern Pipeline, stating that in that case "the absence of
consent to an initial adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal was relied on as a significant
factor in determining that Article III forbade such adjudication." Id.
51. Id. at 3257. Moreover, the Court stated that "[e]ven were there no evidence of an
express waiver here, Schor's election to forgo his right to proceed in state or federal court on
his claim and his decision to seek relief instead in a CFTC reparations proceeding constituted
an effective waiver." Id. The Court noted that at the time Schor commenced his reparations
action, a private right of action under the CEA was recognized in the Seventh Circuit, where
Schor and Conti filed suit, and the CFTC's regulations clearly stated that it had authority to
adjudicate all counterclaims arising "'out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.'" Id. (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 3995
(1976) (codified in 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (1987) (corresponds to 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1983)).
Thus, the Court reasoned, Schor's election to proceed in the CFTC's reparations forum constituted an effective waiver of article III's guarantee. Id.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938)).
53. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). For a discussion of Bowsher, see infra text accompanying notes
214-23.
54. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3261.
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ARTICLE III

the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency. The application of
this analysis seems imbued with an attention to the practical effect of
each decision, rather than to the cumulative formal impact upon the separation of powers.
2.

Dissent

In stark contrast to the majority's ad hoc inquiry, the dissent advocated greater respect for the separation of powers concerns of article III
through adherence to a categorical approach. The dissenting opinion,
authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, determined
that the judicial authority of non-article III tribunals should be limited to
three narrow exceptions: territorial courts, courts-martial and courts
which adjudicate disputes over public rights."
Reviewing the purposes of the tenure and salary provisions of article
III,56 Justice Brennan noted that they function to provide judges with
maximum freedom from the possible influence of the executive or legislative branches. 7 This function, in turn, maintains the checks and balances of the federal constitutional structure and protects individual
litigants from decisionmakers who are susceptible to majoritarian pressures.58 Justice Brennan maintained that "these important functions of
Article III are too central to our constitutional scheme to risk their incremental erosion."5 9 The dissent contended that the three non-article III
tribunal exceptions were "based on 'certain exceptional powers bestowed
upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus.' "60 Justice Brennan found nothing to justify an extension of an exception to
allow administrative agency adjudication of state law counterclaims.6 1
The dissent was unimpressed by the majority's references "to legislative
convenience; to the fact that Congress does not altogether eliminate federal court jurisdiction over ancillary state-law counterclaims; and to
55. Id. at 3262 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan thus restated the thrust of his
opinion for the plurality in Northern Pipeline. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-70.
56. See supra note 1 for text of article III, § 1.
57. 106 S. Ct. at 3263 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16
(1955)).
58. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70). See also infra text accompanying notes 130-52.
61. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3263 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized that
the common-law character of the claims in question placed them at the core of the historically
recognized judicial power. Id. at 3263-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982)).
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Schor's consent' to CFTC adjudication."6 2
Justice Brennan also objected to the majority's reliance on the issue
of "legislative convenience" as a factor in its balancing approach. According to the dissent, article III was intended to prevent judicial "abdication to claims of legislative convenience." 63 Justice Brennan urged
that weighing the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency against
judicial independence was improper. The dissenting justice opined that
in doing so, the majority "pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of which
are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not
worth the cost in any single case."" Thus, the dissent noted that in each
case this balance would be inexorably weighted against judicial independence. In the dissent's view, this balancing process would, in the long
run, completely erode article III's protections because of the accumulation of cases where "the Court finds that the short term benefits of
effi65
ciency outweigh the long term benefits of judicial independence."
Furthermore, the dissent determined that the Court's approach to
the separation of powers in Bowsher v. Synar6 6 was irreconcilable with
the Schor majority's approach.67 Justice Brennan pointed out that the
Court in Bowsher rejected the argument that legislative convenience allowed a delegation of executive functions by Congress to the Comptroller
General. 68 The Bowsher Court found such a delegation unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan then turned to the majority's claim that the CFTC's
adjudication of state law counterclaims was an insignificant encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary because the CFTC merely shares
such jurisdiction with the federal district courts. He pointed out, however, that if the reparations proceeding is more convenient and efficient
than federal court litigation, the complainants would overwhelmingly
62. Id. at 3264 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted the majority supported its
holding with the fact that Congress had not given the same broad powers to the CFTC that it
had granted the bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 which were found in violation of article III in Northern Pipeline. Id. at 3264 n.* (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent
agreed that the scope of the CFTC's judicial authority was significantly narrower than that of
the bankruptcy courts. Justice Brennan, however, refused to accord this difference enough
weight to cure the constitutional problems which he determined would result from Congress'
grant of state law counterclaim adjudicatory authority to the CFTC. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. at 3264 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
67. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3265 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
68. Id. (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

ARTICLE III

January 1988]

choose the reparations remedy, thus rendering the sharing of jurisdiction
illusory.6 9 Moreover, Justice Brennan urged, the majority's lack of concern for the slippery slope failed to take into account that Congress can
impair article III's structural and individual protections by diluting the
judicial power of the federal courts rather than completely reassigning
the work of article III courts to non-article III tribunals.7"
As for the majority's assertion that its decision involved only a narrow class of state law claims, Justice Brennan argued that a broader principle could emerge from the Court's ostensibly narrow holding.
According to the dissent, "the reasoningof this decision strongly suggests
that, given 'legislative necessity' and party consent, any federal agency
may decide state-law issues that are ancillary to federal issues within the
agency's jurisdiction."7 1
Finally, Justice Brennan attacked the majority's line drawing between the structural and personal guarantees of article III and its reliance on Schor's consent to CFTC adjudication. The dissent viewed the
structural and individual guarantees of article III as inseparable: "The
potential exists for individual litigants to be deprived of impartial decisionmakers only where federal officials who exercise judicial power are
susceptible to congressional and executive pressure." 7 2 Thus, Justice
Brennan asserted, because article III's personal and structural guarantees
are coextensive, a litigant may not waive his right to an article III tribunal "where one is constitutionally required."73
The dissent thus roundly criticized the majority's ad hoe approach
as unsupported by the Constitution, inconsistent with precedent and
heedless of the perils of the slippery slope. In the dissent's view, the
majority's approach allowed the Court to abdicate its responsibility to
give effect to the separation of powers concerns underlying article III. Of
course, neither the majority nor the dissent is susceptible to clear understanding or analysis without some knowledge of the historical background of article III and administrative adjudication.

III.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Article III in ConstitutionalHistory

The basic structure of American government reflects in large part
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 3266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the early perceived need for adherence to a separation of powers doctrine. The framers of the Constitution were acutely aware that "[t]he
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." 4 To insure against this risk of tyranny by one of the branches
of government, the framers made the separation of powers doctrine the
fundamental concept of the constitutional plan; they regarded "the
checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."7 5
With respect to the judicial branch, history reveals that under British rule the framers were unhappy with the judiciary. The Declaration of
Independence charged that the King "obstructed the administration of
justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."7 6 The framers
understood that protections of the tenure and salary of judges, as provided in the Act of Settlement of 1701, had freed English judges from the
King's control before.7 7 Furthermore, they recognized the importance to
the constitutional plan of a judiciary independent of the other two
branches of government and of the people:
If the power of making [appointments of judges to the federal
bench] was committed either to the Executive or legislature,
there would be a danger of an improper complaisance to the
branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or
persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be
too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the constitution and
the laws.7 8
Thus, the framers provided in article III of the Constitution that the fed74. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
76. The Declaration of Independence para. 10-1 1 (U.S. 1776).
77. See Pittman, The EmancipatedJudiciary in America: Its Colonial and Constitutional
History, 37 A.B.A. J. 485, 488 (1951).
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The significance
of an independent judiciary has not been tarnished by time. See, e.g., United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980) ("A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and Legislature
is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government.").
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eral judges be granted permanent tenure and undiminishable compensation.7 9 They intended by these provisions to translate their general
separation of powers concerns into a practice which would maintain the
independence of the federal judiciary." °
B.

History of Judicial Responses to Allocations of FederalJudicial
Power to Non-Article III Tribunals

1. One hundred and fifty years of uncertainty: The haphazard
development of approaches to article III questions
a. American Insurance Co. v. Canter
Against the background of the framers' desire for an independent

federal judiciary, the Supreme Court in 1828 first faced a congressional
grant of federal judicial power to a non-article III tribunal. In American
Insurance Co. v. Canter,8 the Court set its course through what in the
next 150 years was to become one of the most confused areas of constitutional law. Canter posed the question of whether courts of the territory
of Florida, not created under article III and its tenure and salary protections, could be allowed to adjudicate admiralty matters. Article III spe-

cifically made such matters the exclusive province of courts formed
under that article's strictures.8 2 The Court held that Congress could extend the admiralty jurisdiction to such "legislative courts" under its plenary authority over the territories of the United States.83 Chief Justice
79. The "good Behaviour" clause of article III, Section 1 guarantees life tenure to federal
judges, subject only to removal by impeachment. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
The "Compensation" clause guarantees a fixed and irreducible compensation to federal judges.
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 218-21. As Alexander Hamilton observed, "as nothing can
contribute so much to [the federal judiciary's] firmness and independence, as permanency in
office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution; and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and the public security." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523-24 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). And Hamilton further
noted with respect to compensation that "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of judges than a fixed provision for their support ....
In the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
80. The tenure and salary provisions of article III perform other functions as well. They
promote public confidence in judicial decisions by preserving independence from political pressure. They attract well qualified persons to the positions of federal judges, and they promote
judicial individualism. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 59 n.10 (1982); see also Kaufman, ChillingJudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681,
713 (1979).
81. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
82. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1.
83. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 546.
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Marshall, writing for the Court, reasoned that in legislating for the territories, "Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a
State government. '84 Thus, when exercising powers of both a state and
the federal government, Congress is no more constrained by article III's
structural concerns than is a state government.
b. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.
After Canter, the Court devised several ways to uphold the delegation of adjudicative authority to non-article III tribunals. In Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,85 the Court analyzed
Congress' power to delegate to executive officers the power to collect, by
way of a summary procedure, a debt due the government from a customs
agent. Since Congress had provided as well for judicial review of the
summary procedure, the initial question presented was whether the controversy was "judicial" and thus subject to the requirements of article
111.86 The Court pointed out that the plaintiff's argument-that the provision for judicial review rendered the controversy a judicial one-rested
on a faulty premise." "It assumes that the entire subject matter is or is
not, in every mode of presentation, a judicial controversy, essentially and
in its own nature, aside from the will of congress to permit it to be so;
88
and it leaves out of view the fact that the United States is a party."
Because the United States could claim sovereign immunity, an article III
court could not hear the suit without the United States' consent. The
Court stated that the giving of such consent could not bring a matter
"which may not be a subject of judicial cognizance . . . before the
court."8 9 Rather, the choice of tribunal was left to Congress, pursuant to
its power to create "public rights" and, subject to due process,9" to allocate the adjudication of such rights as it sees fit. 9 1
c.

Dynes v. Hoover

Three years after Murray'sLessee, the Court was faced with an exercise of judicial authority by a non-article III tribunal in quite a different
context. In Dynes v. Hoover,92 the issue was whether Congress could
84. Id.

85. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
86. Id. at 275.
87. Id. at 282-83.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 275-77.
Id. at 284.

92. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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grant to courts-martial-the judges of which were without tenure and
salary protections-the authority to adjudicate military and naval offenses free from the requirements of article III. The Court reviewed various constitutional provisions conferring upon Congress powers
respecting the military9 3 and compared them with article III."4 "These
provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offences ...and that the power to do
so is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the
Constitution." 95 Thus, as in Canter,Congress' ability to allocate judicial
power to tribunals of its own choosing, without running afoul of article
III, stemmed from a plenary power distinct from Congress' article III
authority.
d. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.
The idea of a legislative court, conceived in Canter, came before the
Court again in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.96 In Bakelite, the Court considered a request to restrain the Court of Customs Appeals from reviewing
findings of the Tariff Commission. 97 The argument was that an appeal
from the Tariff Commission was not a "case or controversy" as required
by article III, section 2, but was instead an advisory proceeding in aid of
executive tariff enforcement. Thus, it was contended that the Court of
Customs Appeals, as an inferior court created under article III, had no
jurisdiction of such proceedings.9" The Court disagreed and found that
the Court of Customs Appeals was a legislative and not a "constitutional" court, notwithstanding that its judges enjoyed life tenure. 9 9 The
Court reasoned that the matters brought before the Court of Customs
Appeals "include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination." 1" Rather, "all are matters which are susceptible of
legislative or executive determination and can have no other save under
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,c. 13, 14 (the powers to "provide and maintain a Navy" and to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (excepting from the requirement of presentment or indictment of a grand jury before
a person may be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, "cases arising in the
land or naval forces").
94. Dynes, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 78-79.
95. Id. at 79. See also Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1955) (affirming Dynes, but
refusing to extend article I military jurisdiction to civilian ex-soldiers because federal court
jurisdiction under article III would be encroached upon).
96. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
97. Id. at 446.
98. Id. at 448.
99. Id. at 459-60.
100. Id. at 453.
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and in conformity with permissive legislation by Congress."' 0 ' Thus the
Court, echoing the public rights analysis of Murray's Lessee, found that
Congress could assign such matters susceptible to legislative or executive
determination to the tribunal of its choice.
e.

Crowell v. Benson

Shortly after Bakelite, the Court took a different approach to adjudications by non-article III tribunals, abandoning the distinction between
legislative and constitutional courts. In Crowell v. Benson, 02 the Court
upheld provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act"°3 which contemplated that findings of fact by the deputy
commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission "supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, shall
be final."'" In spite of the case's status as "one of private right, that is,
of the liability of one individual to another under the law," ' 5 the Court
concluded that the exercise of this adjudicative power by a non-article III
officer did not violate article III. Indeed, the Court deemed the legislative scheme consistent with article III because it still reserved to a reviewing article III district court full authority to deal with matters of
law, thus providing for "the appropriate exercise of the judicial function
10 6
in this class of cases.'
f

Williams v. United States and O'Donoghue v. United States

The distinction between legislative and constitutional courts was readopted shortly after Crowell in Williams v. United States,1 1 7 and a companion case, O'Donoghue v. United States. 1 8 These cases arose as
challenges to the Legislative Appropriation Act of 1932,109 which provided for the reduction of salaries of non-article III judges.11 ° In
O'Donoghue the Court found that the judges of the courts of the District
101. Id.
102. 285 U.S. 22 (1931).

103. Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, 947-950
(1982)).
104. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46.
105. Id. at 51.

106. Id. at 54. By implicitly labeling that officer an "adjunct factfinder" to the article III
district courts, the Court thus avoided the distinction between "legislative" and "constitu-

tional" courts and the more difficult question of whether that officer exercised the federal
judicial
107.
108.
109.
110.

power at all.
289 U.S. 553 (1933).
289 U.S. 516 (1933).
Ch. 314, 47 Stat. 382 (1932).
Id., § 106, 47 Stat. 382, 401 (1932).
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of Columbia were not subject to salary reductions because those courts
were article III tribunals. Justice Sutherland adopted a literal approach,
reasoning that if a federal tribunal receives jurisdiction over cases such as
those listed in article III, section 2, then it is ipso facto an article III
court.' 11 "The fact that Congress, under another and plenary grant of
power [to legislate for the District of Columbia], has conferred upon
these courts jurisdiction over non-federal causes of action, or over quasi12
judicial or administrative matters, does not affect the question."'
In Williams, the Court adopted an even more contrived literalism in
addressing the question of whether the Court of Claims was an article III
tribunal. It held that although article III states that the federal judicial
power extends "to Controversies in which the United States shall be a
Party,"'1 13 the Court of Claims was nevertheless a non-article III legislative court because article III, section 2 must be construed to read "controversies to which the United States shall be a party plaintiff or
petitioner."'14 Thus, the Court reasoned that courts such as the Court of
Claims, which handle only cases where the United States is a party defendant, cannot be article III tribunals.
g.

Glidden v. Zdanok

This literalism and the strict division between article III authority
and non-article III power were repudiated in Glidden v. Zdanok. 5 The
controversies in Glidden arose when the litigants, on the basis of article
III's tenure and salary provisions, challenged the decisions of judges of
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals sitting by designation on federal district courts. 16 In Glidden, Justice
Harlan, writing for a three-member plurality, reversed Williams and Bakelite, holding that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals are article III courts.11 7 The plurality abandoned the
distinction between legislative and constitutional courts, adopting instead
a pragmatic approach. Justice Harlan reviewed prior Supreme Court de111. O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 545.
112. Id.
113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Section 2 of article III enumerates the types of cases to
which the federal judicial power defined by section 1 extends.
114. Williams, 289 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). The Court opined that since the doctrine
of sovereign immunity renders the United States immune from suit as a party defendant, the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended article III, § 2 to reach such cases, regardless of the United States' consent to such suits. Id.
115. 370 U.S. 530 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
116. Id. at 532-33.
117. Id. at 584.
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cisions sanctioning the creation of courts with judges of limited tenure.
He explained that in each case the authority of the courts was justified by
"[t]he same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result
in Canter.""' 8 'The test proposed by Justice Harlan for discerning between article III and non-article III tribunals was whether a tribunal's
business was of the sort specified in article III and its judges allowed "the
'' 9
independence there expressly or impliedly made requisite."
h.

Palmore v. United States

Glidden's pragmatic approach was reaffirmed in Palmore v. United
States.'2 In Palmore, the defendant challenged the authority of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. That court, which was created
to hear local cases by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 2 did not enjoy article III's tenure and salary
protections. The defendant contended that the court was without authority to try a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code,
22
urging that such a case could only be heard by an article III court.
The Court held that under its article I plenary power to legislate for the
District of Columbia, Congress may provide for adjudication of such
cases by non-article III tribunals. 1 23 The Court noted that "the requirements of Article III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized
1 24
needs and warranting distinctive treatment.'
2.

An attempt at clarity: The Northern Pipeline decision
125
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
the Court faced this jurisprudential background, stretching back to
Canter, of "landmarks on a judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant ar118. Id. at 547. The reference to Canter highlighted, according to Justice Harlan, Chief
Justice Marshall's recognition in that case of "a greater flexibility in Congress to deal with
problems arising outside the normal context of a federal system." Id.
119. Id. at 552. The tautological character of this test is clear, as Professor Tribe notes:
"This is tantamount to saying that Article III courts are those staffed by Article III judges;
Article I courts are those without such judges." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, 90
(1985).
120. 411 U.S. 389 (1973), aff'd, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
121. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
122. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 393.
123. Id. at 410.

124. Id. at 407-08.
125. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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mies have clashed by night."' 2 6 In Northern Pipeline, a sharply divided
Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. t27 The argument was that the Bankruptcy Act
granted article III judicial power to the bankruptcy courts, the judges of
which had no life tenure or salary guarantees. 2 8 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, found that the Bankruptcy Act's jurisdictional grant
violated the Constitution, stating that the grant could not "be sustained
as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III
courts."' 2 9 The plurality opinion attempted to make sense of article III's
confusing jurisprudential history by fashioning three exceptions to article
III's strictures. The plurality insisted that all of the cases in which the
Court had sanctioned exceptions to article III fit into these three categories of "exceptional" grants of power to Congress by the Constitution or
by "historical consensus."' 130 The opinion recited exceptions for territorial courts, courts-martial and tribunals which adjudicate matters involv3
ing public rights.1 '
The first exception, for territorial courts, stemmed from the framers'
intent that Congress was to exercise the general powers of government in
areas in which no state operated as a sovereign. 132 This exception accounted for Canter13 3 and later cases respecting Congress' creation of
126. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
127. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
128. Section 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act made the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
much broader than that which had been exercised under the previous referee system of federal
bankruptcy adjudication. That section of the Act granted the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction
over all "civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to
cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 114, 98
Stat. 343 (1984).
This jurisdictional grant empower[ed] bankruptcy courts to entertain a wide variety
of cases involving claims that may affect the property of the estate once a petition has
been filed under Title 11. Included within the bankruptcy courts*jurisdiction [were]
suits to recover accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to avoid
transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
courts [could] hear claims based on state law as well as those based on federal law.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54.
129. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 87. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment, id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), and agreed with the plurality that
the Bankruptcy Act's grant of judicial authority was not severable from the remainder of the
statute. Id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For that reason, and to allow Congress to
restructure the Act "to conform to the requirements of Art III in the way that will best effectuate the legislative purpose," the entire Act was struck down. Id. at 87 n.40, 88.
130. Id. at 70.
131. Id. at 64-70.
132. Id. at 64.
133. Id. at 64-65.
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non-article III courts in the District of Columbia."'
The second exception, for courts-martial, derived its force from a
similar plenary power in Congress to exercise control over the armed
forces. 3 5 This exception accounted for Dynes and later cases sustaining
the legislative and executive branches' establishment and administration
36

of courts-martial. 1

The third exception, for tribunals which adjudicate matters involving public rights, included Murray's Lessee, Bakelite and, ostensibly,
Crowell.'3 7 However, this category was not so clearly rooted in an "ex-

ceptional" grant of power to Congress. Although the Northern Pipeline
Court maintained that this exception was also based on such a plenary

power,' 38 it admitted that "[t]he distinction between public rights and
private rights [had] not been definitively explained."' 3 9 The plurality dis-

cussed several possible explanations for the existence of the public rights
doctrine."' Thus, no single theoretical principle seems to underlie the

doctrine. However, from the Northern Pipeline plurality's discussion of
the exception, and previous cases in which the Court discussed public
rights, 4 ' three likely bases for the public rights doctrine emerge.

First, a rationale urged by Justice Brennan in Northern Pipeline is
that for a matter to concern public rights, it must "at a minimum" arise
between the government and others. 142 "In contrast, 'the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined,' is a matter of private
rights."'14 1 This rationale "may be explained in part by reference to the
134. See, e.g., Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 (Congress has the power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases over the District); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838)
(same).
135. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66.
136. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth, 350 U.S. 11.
137. But see infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
138. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66.
139. Id. at 69.
140. Id. at 67-69.
141. The public rights doctrine developed initially within the Court's early attempts to discern a difference between the work of article I "legislative" courts and article III "constitutional" courts. This doctrine had its genesis in Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
There the Court asserted that there are matters that involve "public rights," which are "susceptible ofjudicial determination" and which may be in an adjudicable form, but which Congress may or may not, as it sees fit, bring within the cognizance of the federal courts. Id.
However, the Court also stated that Congress cannot "withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Id. (emphasis added).
142. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451
(1929)).
143. Id. at 69-70 (citation omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1931)).
See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
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traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the
Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued.'"
Drawing on Bakelite in this regard, the Crowell Court had noted a distinction

"between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the per-

formance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments." 145 The rationale is that cases of the latter variety are
within an area constitutionally committed to executive or legislative control. Such authority thus carries with it the power to control the mode of
determination.1 46 The Northern Pipeline plurality, relying on Crowell,

further refined this aspect of the public rights doctrine, extending it to
matters which arise between the government and persons subject to its

authority and which historically have been within the prerogative of the
legislative or executive branches. 47
Second, a distinction acknowledged by a majority in Northern Pipeline was that state law rights are inherently private, as opposed to rights
created by federal law.' 48 Such state law rights traditionally are at "the
protected core" of the judicial power assigned to article III courts by the
450 (1977) (public rights cases are those in which the government sues in its sovereign capacity
to enforce rights created by statute); Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451 (legislative courts may freely be
created to adjudicate matters arising between the government and others). But cf Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 n.23 ("the presence of the United States as a proper party to the
proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public
rights' ").
144. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67.
145. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50; see Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451.
146. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451-53. "Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created
for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands,
public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." Crowell, 285
U.S. at 51.
147. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68. See also Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451.
148. In Northern Pipeline, the notion that the public rights doctrine was determinative of
the propriety of a legislative authorization of judicial power to a non-article III tribunal failed
to command a majority of the Court. Notably, however, the concurring and plurality opinions
agreed that the claim there in question was one for which the rule of decision was provided
solely by state law. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (distinguishing the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relationships, "which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power [and] may
well be a 'public right,'" from "state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages"); id. at 90, 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (bankruptcy court adjudication of
claims arising under state law, "counts which are the stuff of the traditional actions at common
law" and for which no federal rule of decision is provided, is not sanctioned by any precedent).
See also id. at 70-71 n.25 (common-law private adjudications within the states remain subject
to article III); Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. 442 (upholding grant of adjudicatory power over federally created public rights to non-article III tribunals where existing state statutory and common law remedies remained unaffected).
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49

Constitution. '
Finally, as the Court first observed in Ng Fung Ho v. White,I" a
difference exists for article III purposes between constitutionally recognized and congressionally created statutory rights.151 The argument, like
article III, is based upon the separation of powers doctrine: "[s]ince the
Constitution's checks and balances are designed principally to guard
against 'encroachment or aggrandizement' by Congress at the expense of
the other branches, the separation of powers doctrine is implicated least
in those situations where Congress is providing for the adjudication of
rights it has itself created."' 5 2
The Northern Pipeline plurality thus set the stage for Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor11 3 with its narrow framework of
exceptions to the requirement of an article III tribunal. 154 However, it is
149. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 n.25.
150. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
151. The Court in Ng Fung Ho distinguished between jurisdiction to deport a known alien,
conferrable upon an executive agency, from jurisdiction to deport one claiming U.S. citizenship, conferrable only upon an article III court. Id. at 284-85. Regarding the danger of deprivation of constitutional rights, "[t]he difference in security of judicial over administrative
action has been adverted to by this court." Id. at 285. See also Crowell, 285 U.S. at 61 (citing
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)).
152. L. TRIBE, supra note 119, at 93.
153. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). Notably, Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline adumbrated the approach taken by the Court in Schor. Justice White interpreted the Court's previous article III decisions as supporting a balancing approach. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
113-14 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent called for a practical approach, one that would read
article III "as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional
values and legislative responsibilities." Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the
dissent provided the basis for the legislative convenience factor of the Schor approach. Justice
White argued that Palmore, which he claimed exemplified the "practical" approach, "rested
on an evaluation of the strength of the legislative interest in pursuing ...one of its constitutionally assigned responsibilities." Id. at 114 (White, J.,
dissenting). This latter contention is
subject to criticism. The basis for it is the statement in Palmore that article III's requirements
must sometimes accommodate plenary legislative power in "specialized areas." Pahnore, 411
U.S. at 408; see supra text accompanying note 124. But Justice White pried this statement
completely out of the context of his opinion for the Court in Palmore. That context logically
(although not explicitly) limited such plenary authority to specialized geographic areas, in that
case the District of Columbia. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76; Currie, Bankruptcy Judges
and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 448-49 n.42 (1983).
154. The Schor Court's radical departure from the mode of analysis employed in Northern
Pipeline should not have come as a complete surprise. To a certain extent, this change was
foreshadowed by the failure of the categorical approach to command a majority in Northern
Pipeline and Justice White's strong dissent in that case. See supra note 153. Moreover, the
public rights theory espoused in Northern Pipeline had a cold reception in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). In Thomas, the Court averred that "the
public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a
quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative branches,' the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced."
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intriguing that analytically, Crowell remains unaccounted for within

Northern Pipeline's narrow exceptions. Crowell involved a suit between
private parties-an employee and his employer-based upon federal stat-

utory law; at issue was adjudication by an administrative agency.' 55 Obviously

the territorial

courts

and courts-martial

exceptions

are

inapplicable to these facts. Although Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
in Northern Pipeline cited Crowell within its discussion of the public
rights doctrine,I5 6 it later distinguished Crowell and United States v. Rad-

datz "7 as cases in which the Court "approved the use of administrative
agencies and magistrates as adjuncts to Art. III courts.'

58

Looking back down this jurisprudential trail, it is at once evident
that the Court has searched long, and often fruitlessly, for a principled

basis upon which to rest its article III decisions. The categorical approach adopted in Northern Pipeline may have represented the Court's
only effort to lend coherence to 150 years of precedent. That effort's
failure to garner a majority, and the rejection of its categorical approach
by the Schor Court, may indicate that this area of confusing precedent

simply cannot be neatly rationalized.
Id. at 589 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68
(1982)). The Thomas Court noted that the majority in Northern Pipeline did not accept the
theory that the public rights doctrine provides a bright line test for determining the requirements of article III. Id. at 585-86. In addition, the Thomas Court rejected the idea that the
identity of the parties alone determined the requirements of article III. Id. at 587. The
Thomas majority feared that if the identity of the parties did perform such a function, "the
constitutionality of many quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies
involving claims between individuals would be thrown into doubt." Id. The majority therefore limited its holding to the assertion that "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose
pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for
agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." Id. at 593-94.
155. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36-37.
156. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70.
157. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
158. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77. See L. TRIBE, supra note 119, at 92 n.81. The
premise underlying this argument is that "even where the Constitution denies Congress the
power to establish legislative courts, Congress possesses the authority to assign certain
factfinding functions to adjunct tribunals." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77. Thus this "'adjunct" or "associate" argument is distinct from Northern Pipeline's three narrow exceptions.
Indeed, "Congress' power to create adjuncts and assign them limited adjudicatory functions is
in no sense an 'exception' to Art. III." Id. at 77 n.29. Cf. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 n.7
(accepting associate factfinding by an administrative agency in cases involving only private
rights).
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C. Origins of the Administrative State and Its Relationship to the
Separation of Powers
Merely because these cases are confusing, however, does not mean
that the principles involved may be left to evolve at random. Agency
adjudication in the modem administrative state must receive a principled

vindication of its constitutionality. An understanding of the structural

159
underpinnings of the administrative process makes this need evident.

From a theoretical perspective, the justification for administrative
159. A brief survey of the historical roots of the American administrative process is illuminating as well. During the first 100 years of the Republic, laissez-faire was the dominant
political and social philosophy. This concept was based on the belief that the individual freedom to make self-interested decisions of whether to buy or sell would result in the production
and exchange of the greatest amount of goods at the least price. Laissez-faire effected a transfer of power from the agrarian and mercantilist society to the entrepeneurial class born of the
Industrial Revolution. The feudal agrarian and mercantilist practices had derived from the
control of government by the landed aristocracy and gentry. But the rapidly expanding horizons of the Industrial Revolution required a dynamic rather than a static ruling society. Thus,
the competition and growth engendered by the laissez-faire attitude displaced active government and left business in control of the administration of the economy. See generally L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 5 (1965).

But laissez-faire was easily corrupted. It failed to account for the power of monopolists to
manage whole markets and impede the flow of capital. It had no remedy for the independent
producer who was left flapping in the gale winds of vast, completely competitive markets,
Administrative regulation of private economic activity developed to fill the void left by the
inadequacy of the common law to solve such complex and specialized problems. See id. at 6.
The prototypical federal agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was established in
1887. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-11917). According to the traditional views, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PROCESS, 26-27 (2d ed. 1985), it was created to protect

shippers from the exercise of monopoly power and rate discrimination by rail carriers, and to
solve the problem of destructive competition. Id. To be effective, the legal controls on a monopolistic carrier
must be a) continuous, b) systematic, c) informed, and d) operative at government
initiative and cost. These requirements are precisely those which are fulfilled by the
.. Interstate Commerce Commission. In the ICC we have an agency which has a
broad supervising as well as rule making and adjudicatory power ....
It is thus a
vast repository of past and current information; and, ideally, the watchman and
judge of the industry.
L. JAFFE, supra, at 6.
The configuration of the ICC did not neatly conform to the rigid nineteenth century conception of the separation of powers. The ICC was given legislative power, ostensibly limited to
Congress by article I of the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § I, to regulate in the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity." R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCESS, 31 (1985). It was also empowered to set rate schedules through the use
of adversary hearings featuring agency administrators as judges, who thereby were exercising
judicial power. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 12, 13, 15, 24 Stat. 379, 383-84 (1887),
amended by ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906). Finally, ICC commissioners were presidential appointees, making the ICC an apparent executive functionary. Id., ch. 104, § 11. 24
Stat. 379, 383 (1887). However, the commissioners could not be removed except "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. This sort of caveat resulted in the terms
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regulation lies in the vast complexity of the functions of modern government. "The performance of these functions requires elaborate administrative machinery. As a result, the bulk of what government does today
is of an administrative nature. Without minimizing the significance of
legislation and the role of courts of law, public administration has be1 60
come more important for the general effectiveness of government."

This importance stems from the incapacity of the legislature and judiciary to adequately accommodate "the expansion of the range of legal intervention in complex economically organized societies." 16 1 Indeed,

institutional and practical limits of traditional legislative and judicial action virtually require the establishment of a fourth branch of government
162
to deal with exigencies of the new tasks of modem government.

The legislature's ability to deal with these exigencies suffers from a

three-fold shortfall: inadequate time; insufficient specialized knowledge
necessary in new areas of legal control; and limited organizational ability
to continually supervise legal development in areas where rules and polithe "fourth branch," and "independent agency," describing the agency's partial independence
from the President and Congress. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra, at 31-32.
Despite these separation of powers concerns, the ICC and similar agencies created during
this period were uneventfully absorbed into the framework of government. A major factor in
this ease of assimilation was that judicial review of agency action provided significant restraint
on agency discretion. Id. at 32. This judicial review, which laid the foundations of modern
administrative law, was the outgrowth of the writ system, supplemented by statutory provisions for judicial review. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra, at 27-28.

During the early part of this century, the New Deal spurred dramatic growth in federal
agencies and their involvement in the private economy. See, e.g., Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522) (bringing the banking system under
federal control); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb) (regulating sale of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk) (regulating securities exchanges);
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87) (regulating relations between labor and management). Then, as the crisis of the
Depression faded, critics of the New Deal strengthened their calls for legislation "to respond to
criticisms of the administrative process' fairness and to rationalize disparate administrative
practices along more consistent lines." S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra, at 32. This ultimately culminated in the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60
Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), which heralded the modern
era of administrative law. Now new agencies are created each year; many bear major regulatory responsibilities. Although no one has yet provided a comprehensive enumeration of all
the federal administrative bodies, their number likely exceeds a thousand. For discussions of
the modern proliferation of administrative agencies, and the specific constraints imposed upon
them by the APA, see generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra; R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO &
P. VERKUIL, supra; and G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (2d ed. 1980).
160. F. MARX, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1-2 (1957).

161. Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L. REV.
513, 516 (1964).
162. Stone, supra note 161, at 518-19.
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cies must evolve empirically.' 6 3 These problems of available time and
expertise, and of continuing guidance and supervision, apply to judicial
capacities to accommodate the exigencies of modern government as
well. 6 The need for administration thus is clear: administrative agencies devote all of their time and expertise to tasks for which they were
designed and for which the legislature and judiciary are ill-equipped to
deal. The agencies also are in a far better position to continually supervise regulated industries and adapt to accumulating experience.
But the separation of powers doctrine casts a shadow over the
needed delegation of power to administrative bodies. The doctrine is
threatened by the creation of myriad agencies which perform legislative,
adjudicative and executive functions.
Agencies have been given the authority to promulgate legislation-type rules and simultaneously to apply these rules in given
cases. They have been invested with the power to investigate
and prosecute, and with the power to decide individual controversies. Responsibility for resolving disputes between private
parties has been shifted from courts to agencies. In some cases
legislatures have sought to exclude any judicial review of agencies' actions. The traditional allocation of prosecutorial and
managerial functions to the executive in the implementation of
law has been challenged by the legislative creation of agencies
whose members are to a considerable degree independent of
65
control by the Chief Executive.1
Moreover, the numerous administrative agencies performing adjudicative functions have created vast bodies of law. 166 An overly strict reading of article III and the separation of powers would jeopardize
administrative adjudication and threaten to destroy this vital development of entire fields of law.
Thus, the Supreme Court's task in Schor was to attempt to settle on
a principled basis by which administrative adjudication could be reconciled with the separation of powers concerns underlying article III. "I It
163. Id. at 519. See also Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of
Powers and JudicialSupremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 470 (1957) (noting "the growing
necessity both of relieving the legislature of the burden of taking care of the details of every law
and of having specialized agencies adjust the law to ever-changing situations and needs"): L.
JAFFE, supra note 159, at 37 ("Where not only technical skill but continuous judgment is
demanded the legislature is helpless").
164. Stone, supra note 161, at 522.
165. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 159, at 42-43.
166. Id. at 1-2.
167. One principled approach might be for Congress to pass legislation providing article III

ARTICLE III
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is clearly too late in the growth of the administrative state for such basic
constitutional questions respecting the delegation of adjudicatory power
to agencies to go unanswered.

IV.

ANALYSIS

This Note contends that the Court's attempt failed. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 6 8 does not provide a principled basis
for reconciling non-article III adjudication with the separation of powers.
This section will explain why Schor's balancing approach is inappropriate, both in the general context of article III questions, and in the failure
of its constituent factors to provide limitations on the erosion of the federal judicial power. Next, this section will examine the Court's recent
inconsistent approaches to separation of powers problems, and will
briefly review the theoretical implications of Schor regarding constitutional interpretation. Finally, this section will suggest an alternative analytical framework for use in measuring non-article III adjudicative
authority. The suggested approach shares Schor's implicit concern for
the proper functioning of modern administrative government. But it
poses less danger of eroding article III and places the separation of powers on firmer ground.
A.

The Court's Balancing Approach

1. The impropriety of a balancing test in the article III context
The Schor majority propounded an article III analysis that tosses
article III and its separation of powers concerns into the hopper, to be
weighed against various other factors. 169 But a balancing approach is
wholly inappropriate in the context of article III analysis and places article III and the separation of powers onto an unmarked and illimitable
slippery slope.170
The clearest shortcoming of a balancing approach is that it is not
authorized, even implicitly, by the language of article II.' In addition,
guaranteed salary and life tenure for all administrative law judges. But such a blanket grant of
article III protections would dilute the power and prestige of article III courts, and, in any

event, would likely fail to surmount political and economic barriers.
168. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
170. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3265-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Obviously, the approach of
the Northern Pipeline plurality differs radically from the Schor analysis. The former adopted a
highly structured, formalistic analysis with respect to the separation of powers, while the latter
takes a far looser, functional stance. See infra text accompanying notes 249-52.
171. See Redish, Legislative Courts,AdministrativeAgencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 221 (1983) (criticizing the balancing approach proposed by Justice
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a case-by-case balancing approach is unsuitable for the guaranteed salary
and life tenure provisions of article 111.172 "A balancing approach requires the Court to weigh the legislative interest in freeing the government from the constraints of the salary and tenure protections against
the competing interest in guaranteeing judicial independence. Such a
' 173
balance will invariably favor the legislative interest."
Moreover, the framers themselves clearly provided no exception to
article III's life tenure and guaranteed salary provisions in the event Congress were to find these protections inefficient or inconvenient. Given the
explicit language of article III, section 1, and the clear contemporaneous
statements of the framers' intent, 174 it is probable that the framers would
have rejected an approach giving Congress such free reign. Indeed, "[flt
was assuredly no secret to the framers that insertion of these protections
would restrict Congress; the framers apparently decided that such a bur' 75
den was justified by the need to preserve an independent judiciary."'
The long term effect of Schor on article III, section 1 is not difficult
to discern. Each "reasonable" case, in which the benefits of legislative
convenience are found to outweigh the protections of judicial independence, will weigh heavier on article III, pushing it farther down the slippery slope. Eventually, this skewed balancing approach will result in the
76
gutting of article III and its underlying separation of powers concerns.1
2.

The Schor approach and its lack of limitations

Even assuming, as the majority did in Schor, that article III could be
amenable to some sort of a balancing approach, the majority's analysis
White's dissent in Northern Pipeline and largely adopted by the Schor majority). See supra
note 153 for a discussion of Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline.
172. Redish, supra note 171, at 221.
173. Id. at 221-22. See also Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3264 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor
Redish suggests that salary and tenure guarantees protect the judiciary from "subtle or unstated" pressure rather than "open and heavy-handed" pressure applied in either case by the
legislature and executive. Redish, supra note 171, at 222. Thus the fashioning of article III's
protections as prophylactic, rather than explicitly prohibitive of overt legislative or executive
influence, was meant to protect against such subtle pressure, which is difficult to detect.
174. See generally supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
175. Redish, supra note 171, at 221.
176. A comparison with the balancing process used to interpret first amendment protection
of free expression is instructive. The vague language of the first amendment (that Congress
may not abridge "the freedom of speech") does not demand as strict a construction as the
much more explicit language of article III. The framers did not contemplate a strict construction of the first amendment, in stark contrast to their well-documented contemplation of article III. Moreover, "the potentially severe harm that can result to society from total protection
of expression makes the harm caused by an absolute construction of article III pale by comparison." Id. at 221 n.155.
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rests on uncertain foundations. Perhaps more importantly, the analysis
fails to specify concrete limiting principles that would forestall total ero-

sion of article III's separation of powers concerns. Some suggested bases
of limitation can be gleaned from Schor. These include: the relative allo-

cation of powers between the non-article III tribunal and the federal judiciary; 17 7 the nature of the claim at issue;' 78 whether the jurisdictional
authorization was made to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative
scheme, i.e., for "legislative convenience," rather than to allocate jurisdiction among federal tribunals; 179 and whether the parties have consented to the adjudication by the non-article III tribunal. 8 ° But in a
stronger light, these factors wither and fail to take root in the slippery

slope.
a. the allocation of "essential attributes ofjudicialpower"
In its analysis of the relative allocation of powers between the CFTC
and article III courts, the Court, while acknowledging that "wholesale

importation of concepts of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction into the
agency context may create greater constitutional difficulties," chose not

to prohibit such jurisdiction, disdaining any fear of "some hypothetical
'slippery slope.' "181

Granted, as a primary inquiry, the extent to which
a non-article III tribunal exercises the "essential attributes of judicial
power" is relevant to determining the validity of the tribunal's authority.' 8 2 But its relegation to a secondary factor in a balancing test under-

mines its relevance and makes unlikely any consistency in its application.
After Schor, the likelihood is great that any limitation derived from the
177. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258-59.
178. Id. at 3259-60.
179. Id. at 3260-61.
180. Id. at 3257, 3260.
181. Id. at 3258. The Court stated that the CFTC's exercise of such common-law counterclaim jurisdiction was not unprecedented. Id. Curiously however, the Schor Court cited,
among others, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), for this proposition. Schor, 106 S. Ct.
at 3258. In Katchen, the Court upheld a bankruptcy referee's power to adjudicate state law
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as a creditor's claims in bankruptcy.
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334. The Schor majority failed to note however, that in Katchen there
was no discussion of the article III issue. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79 n.3 1.
Moreover, it is arguable that the CFTC's exercise of common-law counterclaim jurisdiction is not an importation of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction into the agency context. Cf.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (allowing a federal court to assert
pendent jurisdiction over a state claim where the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact") with 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (1987) (corresponds to 17 C.F.R.
§ 12.23(b)(2) (1983)) (CFTC regulation providing for jurisdiction over counterclaims arising
"out of the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences" giving rise to
the complaint alleging violations of federal commodity laws).
182. See infra text accompanying notes 255-63.
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essential attributes inquiry will be overshadowed by considerations of
"legislative convenience." In other words, characterizing the essential
attributes inquiry as merely a part of a weighing process makes it a variable, rather than a fixed factor. The result is that what are "essential attributes" in one case may not be so in another case where the demands of
legislative convenience are greater. Thus, the inquiry will not be the basis of any objectively determinable principles applicable from one case to
the next. In the long run, this will effect a transfer of the "essential attributes" from article III to non-article III tribunals, resulting in the
complete erosion of the federal judicial power.
b.

the nature of the claim

As recently as Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., I" a majority of the Court recognized that state law claims "are
the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at
Westminster in 1789,"'1 " and are matters clearly at the "protected core"
of the judicial power assigned to the independent article III branch.1 8
Thus, the Schor Court's statement that the state law character of a claim
is merely "significant for purposes of determining the effect that an initial
adjudication of those claims by a non-Article III tribunal,"' 186 is a curious turnaround.
Moreover, after relegating state law character from "determinative"
to "significant," the manner in which the Schor Court used the state law
character of a claim in its analysis undermines the assertion that such
character is even "significant." The Court stated that where state common-law rights are at stake its inquiry is "searching."' 8 7 Ostensibly, this
is because common-law actions have traditionally been tried in article III
courts; congressional allocation of such matters to non-article III tribunals magnifies "[t]he risk that Congress may improperly have encroached
on the federal judiciary."' 88 The majority then concluded that Congress
had not attempted to remove the article III judiciary from the determination of common-law counterclaims because the choice of the CFTC repa183. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

184. Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 70 n.25; 94 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). It is notable that although a majority of

the Court could not agree on the propriety of the public rights analysis, a majority, including
Justice O'Connor, author of the Schor opinion, agreed as to the status of claims for which no
federal rule of decision is provided, i.e., state law claims.
186. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
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rations forum was left entirely to the parties and "the power of the
federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these [common-law] matters is
unaffected." 18 9 Whether this reflects a "searching" inquiry, or even one
that looks "'beyond the form to the substance of what' Congress has
done, ' 190 is open to question on two bases.
First, this conclusion assumes that consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of a non-article III forum diminishes separation of powers concerns. This is a questionable assumption which the majority itself at least
partially refuted elsewhere in the opinion. 91 Second, this conclusion-if
it indeed looks to the "substance" of what Congress has done-fails to
consider the practical effect its validation of the CFTC's counterclaim
jurisdiction will have on the federal courts. The dissent was careful to
note this effect: "If the administrative reparations proceeding is so much
more convenient and efficient than litigation in federal district court...
complainants would rarely, if ever, choose to go to district court in the
first instance. Thus, any 'sharing' of jurisdiction is more illusory than
192
real."
This usurpation of article III power is magnified by the impropriety
of considering the nature of the claim in the balancing context. The nature of the claim is relevant to whether its adjudication by a non-article
III tribunal is proper."' But under the Schor approach each "reasonable" decision extending to non-article III tribunals jurisdiction over
claims not of congressional creation will go a step beyond the previous
decision. This will be particularly true where convenience and efficiency
are accorded such weight as they were in Schor. The result will be that,
over time, the character of the claim at issue will impose fewer and fewer
limitations on non-article III adjudication. Eventually, the cumulative
weight of these decisions will analytically validate the transfer ofjurisdic189. Id. at 3260.
190. Id. at 3259 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
589 (1985)).
191. Id. at 3257-58; see infra text accompanying note 209.
192. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3265 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority, in support of its
conclusion that Congress' authorization of common-law counterclaim jurisdiction to the
CFTC did not represent an attempt to withdraw such claims from judicial cognizance, distinguished the CFTC scenario from a hypothetical one in which Congress creates a phalanx of
non-article III tribunals equipped to handle all the work of article III courts. Id. at 3260. But
Justice Brennan pointed out that "Congress can seriously impair Article III's structural and
individual protections without assigning away 'the entire business of the Article III courts.'...
It can do so by diluting the judicial power of the federal courts." Id. at 3266 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Thus, impairment of article III's protections can occur whether the power of article III courts is removed wholesale or piecemeal.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 257 and 264-67.
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tion over common-law claims-which will likely occur in actual factfrom article III courts to the more attractive non-article III tribunals.
c.

"legislative convenience'"

"Legislative convenience," is characterized by the Schor Court as
the concerns that caused Congress to authorize the exercise of judicial
power by a non-article III tribunal. It suffers from the same illimitability
as the nature of the claim factor. It presents a threat to the separation of
powers in the long run by balancing nonconstitutional factors against the
separation of powers, with the scale inherently tipped to the side of the
nonconstitutional considerations.
The Court urged that for it to have held that the authorization of
common-law counterclaim jurisdiction to the CFTC was a violation of
article III, would have defeated "'the obvious purpose of the legislation
to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned
to that task.' "194 In other words, the Court opined that article III concerns did not compel a "degree of prophylaxis" which would have frustrated legislative convenience. However, common sense reveals that
imposing quantitative limits on the need for promptness, continuity, expertise and low cost is a next to impossible task. Indeed, given that these
factors are the very justification for administrative adjudication in the
first place, 95 it is difficult to imagine how a court would find the legislative need for them insufficient in any case involving an administrative
agency.
The Court's narrow view of its approach to legislative convenience
ignores the long range implications of its holding. As Justice Brennan
observed in dissent, while weighing the legislative interest in convenience
and efficiency against judicial independence "creates the illusion of objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result was foreordained, because the
194. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1931)). This
reliance on the oft-quoted language of Crowell, see. e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985), if it is indeed reliance, may be misplaced. The
discussion from which it was taken concerned the question of whether the factual findings of
the agency, apart from cases involving constitutionalrights, should be final and was within the
broader context of a discussion of whether judicial review saved the congressional scheme in
question from due process attack. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 45-47. See also Comment, Judicial
Review of Administrative Findings-Crowell v. Benson, 41 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1932).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
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balance is weighted against judicial independence."' 9 6 This inherent imbalance occurs because the benefits of convenience and efficiency are immediate, concrete and easily understood. But the benefits of judicial

independence are almost entirely prophylactic, and
thus often seem re19 7
mote and not worth the cost in any single case.

The specific idea that legislative need may influence article III analysis was supposedly recognized in Palmore v. United States. 98 It was
observed even earlier that "necessity" may require that constitutional
guarantees be interpreted flexibly.199 But such an argument rests on the
underlying assumption that the subject matter of the question implicated

by legislation is one over which Congress enjoys, explicitly or implicitly,
a plenary grant of power that enables it to go beyond the restrictions the

Constitution imposes on the federal government. In Palmore, for example, the Court was concerned with whether District of Columbia courts
granted judicial power by Congress had to be article III tribunals. In
concluding that they did not, and that article III's requirements had to
accommodate legislative need, the Court observed that Congress' author-

ity in such areas was plenary: "'In legislating for [the District of Columbia], Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a
state government.' "2" No similar grant of plenary power exists for leg196. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3264 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Redish, supra note 171, at
221-22.
197. As Justice Brennan went on to say, the real danger of the Court's approach is that "as
individual cases accumulate in which the Court finds that the short-term benefits of efficiency
out-weigh the long-term benefits of judicial independence, the protections of Article III will be
eviscerated." Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3264 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Admitting that in this case
the extent of intrusion on the judicial branch could conceivably be characterized as de
minimis, Justice Brennan reminded the Court that the reasoning of its decision "strongly suggests that, given 'legislative necessity' and party consent, any federal agency may decide statelaw issues that are ancillary to federal issues within the agency's jurisdiction." Id. at 3265
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
198. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). The Court there emphasized that article III's requirements must,
in limited circumstances, yield "to accommodate plenary grantsofpower to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive
treatment." Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
199. See Murray'sLessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 282 (noting that "imperative necessity" has
required that summary tax procedures be yielded to).
200. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 403 (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
546 (1828)). See also supra text accompanying notes 81-84 and 92-95; Krattenmaker, Article
III and JudicialIndependence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional,70 GEO.
L.J. 297, 308, 312 (1981).
Indeed, to read Palmore as supporting the weighing of legislative convenience against
article III's protections would find in that case a basis for wider use of non-article III adjudication than was there at stake. Any abdication to legislative convenience which may have occurred in that case was logically limited to the extent of Congress' plenary power over the
specialized geographic area of the District of Columbia. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76;
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islation concerning most administrative adjudications, including for example, adjudication of commodity futures trading disputes.

Perhaps most disturbing of all is the Court's frequent incantation of
effectiveness, promptness, workability, continuity and efficiency as the

overriding legislative needs which combine to outweigh the limitations of
article 111.201 First, the Court's deference to efficiency and convenience
flies in the face of its language in Bowsher v. Synar,2 °2 that legislative

convenience could not save a violation of the separation of powers from a
finding of unconstitutionality.20 3 Second, these references represent an

infusion of decidedly nonconstitutional factors into the Court's constitutional interpretation. This suggests that the Court's role is expanding
into the consideration of policy values versus constitutional values. 2°4
d. party consent

With respect to party consent as a factor in its analysis, the Schor
Court discussed a clear division between the personal and structural

guarantees of article III. It then applied a waiver theory to the personal
guarantee.20 5 This is unsettling in light of the Court's later acknowledge20 6
ment that consent is irrelevant to the structural concerns at issue.
Without question, article III's tenure and salary provisions safeguard
both the role of the courts within the tripartite federal system and liti-

gants' right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination from the coordinate branches of our government.2 °7

Viewed in the abstract solely as a personal right, article III's guarantee
seems subject to waiver.20 8 However, the Schor majority itself admitted
Currie, supra note 153, at 448-49 n.42; Redish, supra note 171, at 220 n.147. See also supra
note 153.
201. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3260..
202. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
203. See infra text accompanying note 229.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
206. See supra text accompanying note 52.
207. Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3334. See also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58 (article III
serves as "an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and as a
guarantee of judicial impartiality").
208. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc. 725 F.2d 537. 543
(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984) (allowing waiver in civil case of personal right to
article III judge, on condition that waiver is free and voluntary, instead of choice between nonarticle III forum or "the endurance of delay or other measurable hardships"): WhartonThomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing waiver in civil case of
right to article III judge, where consent was "uncoerced and submitted pursuant to statutory
safeguards"). But see Note, FederalMagistratesand the PrinciplesofArticle III. 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1947, 1952-54 (1984) (article Ill does not create personal right to article III judge; thus
there can be no waiver of nonexistent right).
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that where article III's structural limitations are at issue, "notions of

consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve
'20 9
institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.

Indeed, if one accepts Justice Brennan's more logical contention that article III's personal and structural protections are coextensive,2"' it is
clear that notions of consent and waiver can never be dispositive in article
III analysis because each article III violation implicates both individual
interests and "institutional interests" that, as the majority admits, the

parties cannot be expected to protect.2 1 It is simply inappropriate to
view article III's guarantee solely as a personal right subject to waiver.
Viewed in this light, the majority's drawing of such a clear distinction
between the personal and structural guarantees that article III can be
said to be directed primarily at the protection of personal interests, 212 is

mystifying. 1 3 One is forced to speculate that the consent discussion was
intended to open the door for resolution of future article III controver209. Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3257-58.
210. See infra note 213.
211. "[T]he parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty." Schor, 106 S.Ct.
at 3257.
212. See supra text accompanying note 49.
213. Indeed, Justice Brennan was of the opinion that the personal and structural interests
served by article III are inseparable:
The potential exists for individual litigants to be deprived of impartial decisionmakers only where federal officials who exercise judicial power are susceptible to
congressional and executive pressure. That is, individual litigants may be harmed by
the assignment of judicial power to non-Article III federal tribunals only where the
Legislative or Executive Branches have encroached upon judicial authority and have
thus threatened the separation of powers.
Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3266 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV.277, 312-13 (1984) ("the actual allocation of political power affects the dynamics of a system of civil liberties").
From a historical perspective, Justice Brennan's seems the better view. See, e.g., Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (article III provides no constitutional right to trial
before tenured judge); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (article III was designed to give
judges maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by the executive or legislative
branches, and included other safeguards designed to protect defendants against oppressive governmental practices); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-33 (1932) (tenure and
salary provisions of article III, § I are essential safeguards adopted as continuing guarantee of
independent judicial administration for benefit of the whole people).
Historically, article III's tenure and salary provisions were thought primarily directed at
promoting:
that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of
the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to persons and with equal concern for the
poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private
grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not
restrictively.
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920).
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sies on the basis of the parties' consent, without reference to structural
concerns.
3.

The inconsistent approaches of Schor and Bowsher to the
separation of powers

In addition to lacking limiting principles, the approach of the Schor
majority raises questions on a more fundamental level. The Schor opinion presents a radically different approach to the doctrine of separation
of powers from that of Bowsher v. Synar,2 14 a case decided the same day
as Schor. Bowsher involved a challenge to the recent budget legislation
popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Gramm-Rudman Act). 15 The Gramm-Rudman Act required that if in any fiscal
year the federal budget deficit exceeded the stated maximum by greater
than a certain amount, across-the-board cuts in federal spending were to
be made.2 16 The Act's "reporting provisions"2" 7 required the Director of
the President's Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional
Budget Office to submit their deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General was empowered, after reviewing the reports, to make final calculations of the
spending cuts, which he was to submit to the President for enforcement.2 1 8 A separation of powers problem arose because the Comptroller
General was subject to congressional removal from office, but his powers
under the Gramm-Rudman Act were "executive," making him a legislative functionary exercising executive powers. 21 9
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, took a
formal approach to the separation of powers problem. The opinion emphasized the categorical character of the tripartite form of government,
drawing from Montesquieu's thesis of checks and balances. 220 The Court
stressed the necessity of maintaining coequal branches and protecting
each from influence of the others. 22 ' According to the Court, "[tihe
structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the
laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control
214. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
215. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1063 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. III 1985).
Id. § 901(a) (Supp. III 1985).
Id. § 901(b) (Supp. III 1985).
Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3185-86.
Id. at 3186-87.
Id. at 3188 (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935)),

January 1988]

ARTICLE III

what it does not possess. ' 2 2 2 Conversely, "Congress cannot reserve for
itself the power of removal of an22 officer charged with the execution of the
laws except by impeachment. 1
The strict, skeletal approach of Bowsher to the separation of powers
stands in stark contrast to the ad hoe, fluctuating approach of Schor.
Their analyses are completely inconsistent. Schor balances while Bowsher categorizes. One rationalization of the difference is that each analysis is driven by a different concern. Bowsher's "formalistic" approach
reflects the fear that national government has evolved beyond effective
control.2 24 Schor's "functional" approach reflects the fear that an unnecessarily strict construction of the separation of powers will require the
dismantling of the administrative state.2 25 Whatever the reasons for the
difference, commentators, and not the Justices, have explained them.22 6
This apparent inability of the Justices to provide an explanation for the
dichotomy raises an even more critical issue-the proper role of judges in
general. The basis of judges' authority is that their determinations rest
on consistent reasons that transcend the immediate result in any given
case.22 7 "A judiciary that asserts the power to impose legal obligation or
sanction without recognizing the duty of coherence
and explanation is
22 8
one... we as a people have not chosen.,
Theoretical implications aside, specific language appears in Bowsher
that is wholly inconsistent with the "legislative convenience" so heavily
relied upon in Schor's balancing approach: "'[T]he fact that a given law
or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions
of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks--of democratic government .... 229
4. Schor and theories of constitutional interpretation
The Schor majority's repetitive and dogmatic invocation of efficieficy and convenience, while engaged in an interpretation of constitu222. Id.
223. Id.

224. See Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions- A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 490 (1987).

225. See id. at 490-91.
226. See, e.g., id. Professor Strauss advocates a functional approach as being more consistent with the realities of modem government and the "fourth branch."
227. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1959).
228. Strauss, supra note 224, at 510-11.
229. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3193-94 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
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tional text, adds an interesting note to the case: the ongoing controversy
over the proper method of constitutional interpretation.

Often in constitutional adjudication, the question is whether the
constitutional text, as the embodiment of the "original" intent of the
framers, "should be the sole source of law for purposes of judicial review,
or whether judges should supplement the text with an unwritten consti-

tution that is implicit in precedent, practice, and conventional
230
morality.
Originalism posits that the meanings of constitutional provisions
which are supplied by the plain language of the text and the framers'
state of mind are authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpreta-

tion. 23 1 The argument is that "by following the plain language of a provision and by researching the proceedings and/or the legal and social
context surrounding a provision's adoption," judges make reliable and
authoritative decisions in constitutional cases.232 Its proponents argue

that this originalist view is
deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of

political legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal
constitutional law; it is, after all, the theory upon which judicial
review was founded in Marbury v. Madison.

The chief virtue of this view is that it supports judicial review while answering the charge that the practice is undemocratic. Under the pure [originalist] model . . . when a court
strikes down a popular statute or practice as unconstitutional,

it may always reply to the resulting public outcry: "We didn't
'2 33
do it-you did."

230. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) [hereinafter Grey 1].
Others have also recognized this clash of ideologies. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum ofPrincile,56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471 (1981).
The opposing positions often respectively are called "intentionalist" and "nonintentionalist," Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 886
(1985), or even "textualist" and "supplementer," Grey I, supra, at 1, but will be referred to
here as "originalist" and "nonoriginalist."
231. Simon, The Authority of the Framersof the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretation
Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1985).
232. Id.
233. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975)
[hereinafter Grey II]. For more on the nexus between theories of judicial review and democracy, see J. ELY, supra note 230, at 73-104.
Those advocating the originalist position have much in common with Justice Black, who
during his tenure on the Court, consistently urged "fidelity to the constitutional text in judicial
review, and the illegitimacy of constitutional doctrines based on sources other than the explicit
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The nonoriginalist theory that courts ought to apply values not articulated in the constitutional text when they decide the constitutionality
of legislation derives its modem support from cases involving the rights
of individuals.2" 4 This expanded view of judicial review articulates the
courts' role as the exponents of national ideals of liberty and fairness,
notwithstanding that these ideals are not explicit in the constitutional
text. 235 Yet nothing inherent in the theory militates against its application in contexts beyond due process and equal protection, such as article
III.
The majority in Schor seems to have adopted such a nonoriginalist
stance by according weight in its article III analysis to nonconstitutional,
contemporary values such as efficiency and legislative convenience equal
to that given textually based factors such as the separation of powers.
Moreover, Justice Brennan, in dissent, adopted an originalist stance by
urging rigid adherence to the intent of the framers and the separation of
powers doctrine. No attempt will be made here to analyze the propriety
of the positions in this debate represented by the majority and dissent.
Recently, it seems that such a normative assessment requires a choice
between one side or the other of some political fence.2 36 Instead, for
present purposes it is sufficient to illustrate the irony of the respective
positions taken, and to suggest possible reasons peculiar to separation of
powers problems for this ironic shift in ideologies amongst the justices.
commands of the written Constitution." Grey II, supra, at 703. For examples of Justice
Black's jurisprudence, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
234. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy, encompassing abortion
decision); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (right to privacy, encompassing abortion decision and physician's right to practice); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (right against
cruel and unusual punishment); Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (right to vote); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (right to equal protection, encompassing integrated education); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (right to conduct business free from
government sanctioned private regulation); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (right to private property, encompassing slave
ownership).
235. Grey II, supra note 233, at 706. According to Professor Grey, the difficulty in justifying such a role for the courts explains their tendency "to resort to bad legislative history and
strained reading of constitutional language to support results that would be better justified by
explication of contemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from the constitutional
text." Id.
236. This is because currently the most visible proponent of strict originalism appears to
represent the views of the Reagan administration. See Meese, The Battlefor the ConstitutionThe Attorney General Replies to His Critics, 35 POL'Y REV. 32 (Winter 1985); Address of the
Honorable Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States, before the American Bar
Association, at 11, July 17, 1985.
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The injection of modem mores of efficiency and legislative convenience into the majority's constitutional analysis is ironic, considering the
apparently originalist attitudes of Justice O'Connor and the openly
originalist philosophy of Justice Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor has stated
that "the judge's role is 'one of interpreting and applying law' and it is
not 'the function of the judiciary to step in and change the law because
times have changed or because cultural mores have changed.' "237 Justice Rehnquist, whose concurring opinion in Northern Pipeline was
joined by Justice O'Connor, has attacked the nonoriginalist theory. 238
According to Justice Rehnquist, judges who supplement the constitutional text and framers' intent with contemporary values "are no longer
the keepers of the covenant; instead they are a small group of fortunately
situated people with a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state
legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what
is best for the country."239
This language stands in stark contrast to the Schor majority's invocation of modem values, foreign to the constitutional text and the framers' intent.2 4° Why the reliance on efficiency and legislative convenience?
Perhaps the answer is revealed by Justice Rehnquist's commentary
above.24 1 In Schor, no danger existed that by adopting contemporary
norms, the majority would second guess Congress. Indeed, by the very
consideration of these particular nontextual factors, the majority deferred to congressional judgment. Maybe a desire to reach Schor's deferential result underlay the majority's citation of efficiency and legislative
convenience. If so, such deference seems quite out of place in a case
purporting to define the parameters of Congress' authority to assign judicial authority to non-article III tribunals.
Even more ironic is Justice Brennan's rejection of the consideration
of contemporary values in favor of a line hewn close to the text of article
III and the framers' underlying separation of powers concerns. In a
scathing attack on the originalist position made prior to Schor, Justice
Brennan said of this "facile historicism":
It is a view that feigns self-effacing deference to the specific
judgments of those who forged our original social compact.
237. Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitutional
Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J. 259, 270 (1982) (quoting Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1981, at 12, col. 2).
238. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
239. Id. at 698.
240. No "administrative state" existed during the time of the Constitution's framing; thus it
seems obvious that accommodating the needs of this vast machinery could never have been
contemplated by the framers.
241. See supra text accompanying note 239.
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But in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked as humility.
It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can guage
accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle
to specific, contemporary questions.24 2
He continued: "Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of
1789 specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a blind eye to social
progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to changes of
social circumstance."24' 3 Justice Brennan claimed that the ultimate question in reading the Constitution is "what do the words of the text mean
in our time?' "24 Thus, prior to his dissent in Schor, Justice Brennan was
of a mind that the Constitution's genius lies in "the adaptibility of its
245
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.1
How does one explain, then, Justice Brennan's vigorous assertion in
Schor that the "current needs" of efficiency and legislative convenience
ought not receive such consideration as the Schor majority accorded
them? The answer lies perhaps in Justice Brennan's conception of the
threat to individuals posed by expanding government. He has asserted
that "the possibilities for collision between government activity and individual rights will increase as the power and authority of government itself expands, and this growth, in turn, heightens the need for constant
vigilance at the collision points."2'46 It is possible that Justice Brennan's
concerns for the danger to individual rights posed by the expanding administrative state outweigh his belief that modern norms ought to inform
constitutional analysis.
From a broader perspective, the role switching engaged in by the
justices in Schor may be simply a function of the difficulty inherent in
trying to reconcile modern administrative process with our country's
traditional constitutional framework. This Note will not propose a
model of judicial review that picks a side in or proposes a solution to the
originalist-nonoriginalist debate. It will, however, propose a method for
determining the propriety of non-article III adjudication that accommodates both the textual concerns of the separation of powers and the
nontextual needs of the modern administrative state.
242. W. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
presented at Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University, October 12, 1985, at 4.
243. Id. at 5.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 10.
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B. An Alternative Rationalefor Discerning the Limitations on
Adjudication by Non-Article III Tribunals

1. The search for a separation of powers model
Whatever its textual or nontextual basis, any rationale for defining
the limits of article III must accomodate the necessarily complex structure of modem government into the Constitution's tripartite distribution
of authority. In other words, the task is to devise a working model of
the separation of powers that somehow reserves a place for administra-

tive agencies. Reaching the defensible result of preserving administrative
adjudication is what the Schor Court attempted to do. But devising a
model susceptible of consistent application is a difficult task, as evidenced
by the Court's inability to settle on a single scheme to explain its results
in Bowsher and Schor. "For the moment ...the Court appears to be at

sixes and sevens about the appropriate analytic technology for resolving
'
separation-of-powers issues." 247
For years the Court has been unable to
cling to either a formalistic or a functional approach. A formalistic ap-

proach is "grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw
rather sharp boundaries), [while] a functional approach ... stresses core

function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when
these attributes are not threatened." '

Clearly though, the Schor analysis is as functional an approach as
can be adopted.2 49 The risk of a functional approach that goes to the

extreme of balancing the threat to the judiciary's independence against
247. Strauss, supra note 224, at 526.
248. Id. at 489 (footnotes omitted). Professor Strauss takes the functionalist position.
Though his theory cannot be reproduced here in its entirety, essentially it is that the Constitution describes three generalist institutional heads of political and legal authority. Id. at 492.
Each one "serves as the ultimate authority for a distinctive governmental authority-type (legislative, executive, or judicial). Each may be thought of as having a paradigmatic relationship,
characterized by that authority-type, with the [administrative] government that Congress creates." Id. The administrative level of government exercises all three of these functions, see,
e.g., supra text accompanying note 165. Therefore, a separation of powers theory which is so
strictly formalistic that it forbids these functions from being combined is unrealistic. Strauss,
supra note 224, at 493.
The solution, according to Professor Strauss, is to examine, without placing agencies in
any one branch, agencies' "relationships with each of the three named heads of government, to
see whether those relationships undermine the intended distribution of authority among those
three." Id. at 493-94. This type of functional analysis obviates characterizing administrative
government as either "executive" or as partly executive (the nonindependent agencies, such as
the State Department) and partly independent (the "fourth branch" agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission). Id. at 494-96.
249. See id. at 512 (contending that Schor represents one pole of clash "between rigid rule
and individualized judgment").
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legislative convenience is too great.2 5 The risk is "that the repetitive
making of 'reasonable' choices by Congress will, over time, erode the
independence of the judiciary.... The argument is that a series of small
steps, each reasonable within its context, provides a means by which
Congress may subordinate [the judiciary]."2 5' 1 On the other hand, the
rigidly formalistic approach exemplified by Northern Pipeline and its narrow categorization was just as destructive. The risk posed by the Northern Pipeline plurality's approach is destruction of institutionsadministrative agencies-that have worked well in carrying out tasks
that represent a large part of modem government.25 2 Thus, the search
should be for an analytical approach that avoids the extremes of Schor
and Northern Pipeline.
2.

A proposal: The article III adjunct approach
a. the adjunct approach and its basis

The adjunct approach to article III's limitations exemplified by
Crowell v. Benson 25 3 and United States v. Raddatz2 54 provides the an-

swer. Both cases have been distinguished as properly demonstrating the
use of administrative agencies and magistrates, respectively, as adjuncts 25 5 to the federal judiciary. 25 6 The inquiry under this rationale is

two-pronged: an assignment of adjudicatory power to a non-article III
tribunal "is consistent with Art. III so long as 'the essential attributes of
the judicial power' are retained in the Art. III court, and so long as Congress' adjustment of the traditional manner of adjudication can be suffi25 7
ciently linked to its legislative power to define substantive rights.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 170-76.
251. Strauss, supra note 224, at 522.
252. See Redish, supra note 171, at 200 (noting that plurality's decision leads to conclusion
"that much of the work of most federal administrative agencies is unconstitutional."); Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (to preclude Congress from
creating seemingly "private" right appropriate for agency adjudication with limited federal
judicial involvement would "erect a rigid and formalistic restraint on the ability of Congress to
adopt innovative measures ... with respect to rights created by a regulatory scheme.").
253. 285 U.S. 22 (1931).
254. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
255. The word "adjunct" is susceptible of various meanings. One definition is of appurtenance: "Something added to another, but in a subordinate, auxiliary, or dependent position."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (5th ed. 1979). However, this Note proposes a construction of
"adjunct" which emphasizes association instead of appurtenance. That is,as used here, "adjunct" should be understood to mean "one who shares with another an enterprise, business, or
action," WEIIST-R's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL. DICTIONARY 132 (1976).

256. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
257. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77 n.29 (citations omitted); see Crow'ell. 285 U.S. at 5051. The Schor majority considered these two factors in its balancing approach. See supra text
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Framing the question in this way avoids the perils of the slippery slope
posed by the Schor balancing approach, and avoids as well the inflexibility of the Northern Pipeline plurality's rigidly compartmentalized
approach.
The "essential attributes" inquiry in Crowell contained three elements that indicate those attributes remain in the article III district
court: (1) the agency's findings of law are reviewed de novo; 258 (2) the
agency's findings of fact are reviewed under a "weight of the evidence"
standard, or some standard stricter than the "clearly erroneous" standard to which the bankruptcy courts' factfindings were subject; 2 9 and
(3) the agency lacks power to enforce its own orders.260
Raddatz exhibited similar concerns. In Raddatz, the Court upheld
the Federal Magistrates Act of 1978261 which allowed district courts to
refer certain pretrial motions, including those involving constitutional
rights, to a magistrate for initial determination.26 2 In particular, the
Northern Pipeline plurality noted that the Raddatz Court had observed
"that the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations were subject to de novo review by the district court, which was free to rehear the
evidence or to call for additional evidence., 263 The overriding concern in
both cases was that the ultimate decisionmaking authority remained with
the article III district court.
With respect to the second prong of the adjunct inquiry, the Northern Pipeline plurality rejected the notion that Congress possesses as
broad a discretion in assigning judicial power to adjuncts adjudicating
rights not created by Congress as it does in assigning judicial power to
adjuncts adjudicating congressionally created rights. 2 " It asserted that
"the Court's scrutiny of the adjunct scheme in Raddatz-which played a
role in the adjudication of constitutionalrights-was far stricter than it
accompanying notes 36-43. However, the use of these factors in the adjunct approach is analytically distinct in two ways from their use in Schor's balancing approach. First, their use
generally as mere factors in a balancing test reduces their impact and makes them more prone
to manipulation than if they were considered outside of the balancing context. Second, balancing them against "legislative convenience" reduces their import even further when the factor of
legislative convenience is perceived as strongly dispositive-a result likely in the case of most
administrative agencies. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
258. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 49.
259. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85.
260. Id. at 78.
261. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982).
262. Id. § 636(b)(1).
263. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79 (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 67677, 681-83 (1980)).
264. Id. at 81-82.
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had been in Crowell."26' 5 But the plurality then admitted that crucial to
the Raddatz Court's decision was the fact that the ultimate decision was
made by the district court; 2 6 6 thus the second prong's inquiry seems
highly dependent upon the result of the first prong's inquiry. In other
words, the genus of the right at issue seems only to bear on the strictness
of the Court's primary inquiry into the extent of judicial power exercised
by the adjunct.2 67
b.

the adjunct approach and the separation of powers

The adjunct approach also avoids the extremes of the formalistic
and functional approaches to the separation of powers exemplified by
Schor and Northern Pipeline. It is important first to note that the lines
between formalism and functionalism are not clearly drawn. Even an
analysis that considers as relevant a formalistic idea such as "where" in
government administrative adjudication is placed can still sustain the assignment of adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies. Indeed,
Crowell is exactly such a decision.2 68 The Crowell Court upheld agency
adjudication of claims between private parties by placing the agency, in a
metaphorical "adjunct" sense, within the judicial branch.2 69 Moreover,
the metaphorical character of the adjunct argument in Crowell "may be
regarded as functional; in the end it insisted that 'regard must be had...
not to mere matters of form but to the substance of what is required,' and
that from this perspective a suitable arrangement for judicial review 'provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function.' "I" Thus, the
adjunct approach represents the middle ground between extreme formalistic and functional approaches to separation of powers problems under
article III.271
265. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. at 83.
267. See id. at 84-85. As for any meaningful distinction between state law rights and constitutional rights for these purposes, there seems to be none: the Northern Pipeline plurality
"lumped constitutional and state law rights together because they are both 'independent of and

antecedent to the reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the Bankruptcy
Court."' TRIBE, supra note 119, at 94 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)).

268. See Strauss, supra note 224, at 503.
269. Id. at 504.
270. Id. at 509 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53, 54 (1931)).
271. An alternative which has characteristics of both the formalistic and functional theories

could also be advanced. Where the text and legislative history of the Constitution are not
helpful in providing insight into the exact scope of a constitutional provision, the Court has
often turned to historical practice as an aid to interpretation. Note, Recess Appointments to
Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practicein ConstitutionalInteipretation, 84 COLUM.

L. REV. 1758, 1773 (1984). An analysis of historical practice may reveal evidence of a "struc-
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the adjunct approach and the administrativestate

This Note, and much of the literature addressing the constitutionality of adjudicatory powers lodged in administrative agencies, takes the
perspective that the most desirable analysis is one that protects and pretural accommodation" among the three branches of government with respect to the extent of
their respective powers. Id. at 1777. The reasoning is that the legislature, executive and judiciary "are not hermetically sealed units with exactly defined powers." Id. Instead, the three
branches are interlocking spheres of influence, each with a core of constitutionally assigned
functions and enumerated powers. Id. at 1777-78 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121
(1976) (per curiam); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
Thus, situations arise in which it is charged that one branch's interpretation of the
scope of its authority exceeds the limits imposed by either the constitutional text or
structure. In such situations, it may be possible to show that similar exercises of
power have occurred repeatedly in the past and have not been challenged or openly
opposed by the other two branches. A court may be offered this evidence with the
argument that historical practice has 'settled' the constitutional question at issue....
Note, supra at 1778 (footnotes omitted).
The use of historical evidence of structural accommodation to prove that the judiciary
should acquiesce to the exercise of judicial power by non-article III tribunals suffers, however,
from two defects which prevent the judiciary from deferring to such practice. First, the passive role of the judiciary in tripartite government runs counter to the suggestion that its acquiescence to the exercise of judicial power by non-article III tribunals constitutes a structural
accommodation that should be accorded constitutional significance. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1985)(Norris, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1269
(1986). Second, judicial deference to such a structural accommodation is inappropriate when
the personal guarantee of article III is at stake. Id. at 1030 (Norris, J.,dissenting).
Under standards ofjusticiability, federal courts can only act when confronted with a dispute between parties with a concrete stake in the outcome. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 38 (3d ed. 1976). Thus, the courts' role is a passive one. In contrast, the "political"
branches-the legislature and the executive-possess the power "to initiate action to define
operationally their role in the constitutional scheme of separate and divided powers." Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1029 (Norris, J., dissenting). Thus, as to the political branches, structural
accommodation can, in theory, be "inferred from silent acceptance by one political branch in
the face of action by the other." Id. (Norris, J., dissenting). However, due to their passive
role, "silence by the courts cannot be construed as acquiescence in the constitutionality of even
a longstanding practice." Id. (Norris, J.,dissenting). Note, supra, cites several cases in support of the theory that courts ought to give effect to the structural accommodation evidenced
by their historical acquiescence to the exercise of judicial power by non-article III tribunals. It
must be noted, however, that "all of the cases cited ...in support of the structural accommodation theory involve the relationship between the political branches ...and not the independence of the judiciary." Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1029 n. 12 (Norris, J.,dissenting).
Even if such silence could be accorded constitutional significance as a structural accommodation with respect to the relationships between the branches of government, it "cannot be
construed as a waiver of the constitutional rights of individuals." Id. at 1030 (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). "The political branches cannot extinguish such rights by establishing 'adverse possession' through longstanding historical practice." Id. at 1031 (Norris, J.,
dissenting). The Court has affirmed constitutional principles and vindicated individual rights
even in the face of entrenched historical practice. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning previously judicially accepted practice of "separate but equal"
doctrine and generations of acceptance of segregation as consistent with Constitution).
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serves the indispensable role of agencies in government.272 The adjunct
approach is eminently suitable to play such a role, without going so far as
to abandon the analytical process to the slippery slope, as does Schor.
The primary prong of the adjunct approach, whether "the essential attributes of the judicial power" remain lodged in an article III court, 2 7 3 is
an inquiry already well developed within the scope of review doctrine
familiar in administrative law.27 4

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 75 provides for judicial
review of most agencies' actions unless precluded by statute, or unless

agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.2 76 The APA
272. See Strauss, supra note 224, at 490. See also supra notes 160-67 and accompanying
text.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 258-60.
274. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 159, at 185-219, 257-88; L.
JAFFE, supra note 159, at 546-653; Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239 (1986). The strictness of the primary inquiry
seems to depend on the second prong of the inquiry: whether the right being administratively
adjudicated is of congressional creation. See supra text accompanying notes 264-67. Beyond
this, however, exactly to what extent the origin of the right under adjudication dictates what
level of judicial review is required remains unclear. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 82-84;
L. TRIBE, supra note 119, at 96-97.
275. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
276. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 159, at

135. The statutory preclusion provision, see 5 U.S.C. § 701, means that the APA's judicial
review provisions do not apply to agencies created under organic regulatory statutes that explicitly limit judicial review. See Levin, supra note 274, at 243. If Congress has not spoken, or
has spoken ambiguously on judicial review, "the courts presume that Congress intended to
provide a right to judicial review unless there is 'clear and convincing evidence' that Congress
intended to prohibit judicial review." R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 159,
at 135; Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
However, even where Congress has gone to great pains to make limitations explicit, judicial review has been deemed proper when the issue under review did not concern a congressionally created right. This, of course, was precisely the sort of issue involved in Schor. For
example, in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), the Court deemed judicial review appropriate in a case where a claimant challenged the constitutionality of the veterans benefits law.
The statute provided that the Administrator's decisions of fact and law "shall be final and
conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise." 38
U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1982). Notwithstanding this seemingly clear and convincing evidence of preclusion of judicial review, the Court concluded that the claimant's constitutional challenge
"obviously [did] not contravene the purposes of the no-review clause." Johnson, 415 U.S. at
373. Thus, the Court held such a challenge was not clearly and convincingly barred from
judicial review. See also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) (although attorney
general's deportation decisions under the 1952 Immigrations Act were "final," the Court held
that this referred "to finality in administrative procedure" rather than to "cutting off the right
of judicial review").
As for whether agency action is committed to agency discretion by law, judicial review is
precluded if the agency's organic statute is so drawn that a court would have no meaningful
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states that "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. 2 77 Questions of law fall within
the "primary authority" of the courts, triggering their "independent judicial judgment., 278 Agency findings of fact in "formal" proceedingsthose conducted under the APA's trial-type hearing procedures279-are
to be set aside if "unsupported by substantial evidence. ' 280 Thus, with
respect to the bulk of agency adjudications, the essential attributes of
judicial power appear to remain in article III district courts. This relieves any fears that the adjunct approach, when applied, would disrupt
adjudication by the great majority of administrative agencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

The expansion of agency authority and the scope of administrative
adjudication is a development that must be given a principled basis

within the structure of American government. It has not of its own force
diminished the Constitution's concerns for the separation of powers
which were the impetus for lodging the judicial power in an independent

judiciary.
The Schor decision fails to provide this principled basis. Instead, it
represents unwarranted deference to efficiency and legislative convenience. Schor's ad hoc balancing approach threatens, through the tyranny

of small decisions, to erode completely article III's fundamental salary
and tenure provisions, which protect the federal judicial power from
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 830 (1985). Put another way, the court's inquiry is whether in a given case there is
no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
This exception is a narrow one and the presumption is against agency discretion unless the
agency action in question is a decision not to initiate investigative or enforcement proceedings.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838. Even where the exception applies, judicial review of issues not concerning the agency's organic statute (for example, constitutional or common law issues) is
likely to be appropriate. See id.; R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 159, at
140.
277. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
278. Levin, supra note 274, at 246, 267. This indicates that agency findings of law subject to
the APA are subject to de novo review. Policies of judicial deference sometimes come into
play when the law in question is the agency's organic statute, see id. at 268-70, but when rights
not of congressional origin are involved, such as constitutional issues, deference is seldom
afforded the agency's findings. Id. at 270.
279. Section 556 describes requirements for adjudication in the agency context. 5 U.S.C.
§ 556 (1982). Section 556 is invoked by Section 554, which applies in cases where adjudication
is provided for by the agency's organic statute. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
280. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
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usurpation by the political branches. In addition, Schor represents the
Court's inability to settle on a consistent separation of powers rationale,
making that task all the more difficult for the lower courts.
The adjunct approach typified by Crowell and Raddatz should replace the balancing approach of Schor. The adjunct approach provides a
more objective, principled starting point than Schor's ad hoe test for delicate separation of powers questions in the judicial context. Moreover,
the adjunct approach resolves the inconsistency between approaches to
the separation of powers by striking a happy medium that exhibits concerns of both the functional and formalistic approaches. Finally, application of the adjunct approach will not threaten the indispensable role of
agency adjudication in modem government.
Daniel Paul Sedor*

* Special thanks to Carrie Leigh Sedor for her patience and understanding and to Professor Lawrence Solum for his thoughtful guidance.
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